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Introduction	
	The	 U.S.	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008	 clearly	 illustrated	 that	 some	 mortgage	borrowings	 became	 not	 only	 a	 curse	 for	 investors,	 but	 equally	 for	 individual	households	with	a	mortgage	and	for	all	home	owners;	for	the	employed	who	lost	their	jobs,	for	pension	funds	and	last	but	not	least	for	the	U.S.	government	which	saw	its	debt	levels	skyrocket.		The	 fund	 providers	 were	 not	 only	 local	 U.S.	 banks,	 but	 also	 pension	 funds,	investors	 in	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 and	 other	 fund	 providers.	 These	providers	 did	 not	 just	 originate	 from	 within	 the	 United	 States,	 but	 also	 from	many	 overseas	 countries.	 	 Money	 invested	 in	 U.S.	 mortgage-backed	 securities	came	from	around	the	world	and	this	resulted	in	a	crisis	in	the	U.S.	becoming	an	international	financial	pandemic.		Why	did	the	crisis	occur,	how	did	 it	happen	and	what	could	have	been	done	to	avoid	it	happening?			The	prevailing	wisdom	in	the	years	1997-2007	was	that	house	price	rises	in	the	U.S.	were	 the	result	of	 supply	and	demand	 factors	and	 therefore	should	not	be	the	 subject	 of	 government	 intervention.	 The	 2007-2008	 financial	 crisis	disabused	the	world	of	that	notion	in	a	dramatic	fashion.		The	main	driver	of	 the	crisis	was	 the	use	of	borrowed	funds	 to	acquire	homes,	rather	 than	personal	 savings.	Buyers’	 (and	bankers’	 funding)	 sentiment	was	 to	buy	with	(mostly)	borrowed	funds,	relying	on	a	predicted	rise	in	house	prices	to	compensate	 for	 the	 interest	 costs.	 The	 prevailing	 interest	 rates	 mattered	 less	than	the	potential	gains.		Over	 the	 period	 1997-2005	 the	 net	 annual	 increase	 in	 outstanding	 mortgage	amounts	 rose	 from	$216	billion	 in	 1997	 to	 $1.054	 trillion	 in	 2005.	During	 the	same	period	 the	net	annual	 increase	 in	household	 real	 estate	values	 rose	 from	$210	 billion	 in	 1997	 to	 $3.014	 trillion	 in	 2005.	 Homebuyers	 seemed	 to	 have	made	a	wise	decision	during	these	years.		What	was	overlooked,	however,	was	what	 the	economy	could	bear	 in	 terms	of	borrowed	 funds	 as	 compared	 to	 its	National	 Income	 (or	 its	 near	 equivalent	 of	GDP).	In	1997	outstanding	mortgage	levels	were	$3.75	trillion	and	nominal	GDP	$8.6	 trillion.	 In	 2006	 mortgage	 levels	 reached	 $9.9	 trillion	 and	 nominal	 GDP	$13.9	trillion.	The	macro-economic	ratio	of	debt	to	income	had	risen	from	43.6%	in	1997	to	71.2%	in	2006.				A	dynamic	yet	stable	debt-to-income	level	offers	the	best	prospects	for	economic	growth,	not	just	in	one	year,	but	also	over	the	long	run.																																																																																																											
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																																																																																																					Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		No	 effective	 action	 was	 taken	 to	 stop	 the	 excessive	 mortgage	 lending	 growth	over	 the	 period	 1997-2006;	 no	 effective	 action	 was	 taken	 to	 stop	 the			deterioration	in	the	quality	of	mortgage	products	on	offer,	especially	from	2004	onwards;	 no	 effective	 action	was	 taken	 to	 stop	 or	 diminish	 the	 risks	 from	 the	securitization	and	internationalization	of	mortgages.		Various	 policy	 options	 could	 have	 been	 explored	 and	 implemented	 such	 as	 a	“traffic	 light	 system”	 for	 banks	 to	 slow	down	 lending,	when	needed,	 combined	with	a	series	of	“quality	control	measures”.	 	When,	as	 in	2005-2006,	mortgage-lending	 levels	 were	 threatening	 future	 economic	 growth	 levels,	 a	 Macro	Economic	 Reserve	 Policy	 could	 have	 been	 applied.	 It	 would	 have	 involved	 a	transfer	of	some	bank	lending	reserves	from	a	number	of	banks	to	the	Fed	as	a	method	of	economic	risk	sharing	between	Wall	Street	and	Main	Street.	Another	policy	option	could	have	been	 to	establish	a	 lender	of	 last	 resort	 for	 individual	households.	 Such	 organization	 could,	 on	 a	 temporary	 basis,	 have	 combined	 a	type	of	‘helicopter	money’	with	a	lengthening	of	the	mortgage	period,	so	that	the	pressure	 on	 households	 would	 have	 been	 eased	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 A	 Macro	Economic	 Reserve	 Policy	 is	 needed	 before	 a	 financial	 crisis	 erupts.	 The	 use	 of	helicopter	money,	provided	 it	 is	part	of	a	well-designed	program,	 is	part	of	 the	corrective	 options	 after	 a	 financial	 crisis	 has	 occurred.	 Lower	 income	 groups	should	benefit	most.		None	of	these	would	have	required	a	change	in	interest	rate	policy,	which	in	any	event	 had	 not	 been	 effective	 as	 households	 (and	 banks)	 had	 decided	 that	 the	increase	in	house	prices	would	outweigh	the	interest	charges	on	a	mortgage.			The	 “fixes’	 adopted	 after	 the	 crisis	 had	 occurred:	 liquidity	 support	 for	 the	banking	 sector	 and	 quantitative	 easing	 (QE)	 did	 little	 to	 help	 individual	households.	With	the	lowest	 interest	rates	on	record,	households	reduced	their	total	volume	of	mortgage	loans	by	about	$1	trillion	over	the	period	2007-2015.	Mortgage	borrowers	also	profited	very	little	from	QE	as	they	owned	very	few	of	the	government	bonds	and	mortgage-backed	securities.		Lenders	were	the	main	beneficiaries.		The	 conclusion	 must	 be	 that	 prevention	 rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 cure	 the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis	would	have	been	the	best	strategy.	Being	ready	for	the	next	potential	crisis	will	necessitate	having	such	preventive	measures	to	be	in	place.											
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1.	Financial	risk	accumulation	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1997-2007	
	
1.1	The	risk	accumulation	process	
	It	 is	 important	 to	make	 a	 distinction	 between	 short	 and	 long	 term	 household	debt.	 Short	 term	 is	 usually	 meant	 to	 be	 shorter	 than	 a	 year,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	household	 debt,	 the	 definition	 should	 be	 slightly	 lengthened	 to	 stretch	 over	 a	period	of	two	to	three	years.	In	such	case	all	debt	incurred	to	acquire	consumer	goods,	like	cars	and	white	goods,	fall	into	this	category.	Credit	card	debt	may	also	be	regarded	as	short-term	household	debt.		Long-term	household	debt	 is	 incurred	 through	 taking	up	home	mortgages	 and	student	loans.	In	the	case	of	homes	there	is	an	underlying	asset,	but	for	student	loans	the	source	of	repayment	is	the	intellectual	capacity	(to	be)	employed	in	the	workplace.		For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 paper	 the	 main	 focus	 is	 on	 home	 mortgages	 and	 on	household	real	estate	values.		Table	1	gives	an	overview	of	the	collective	level	of	outstanding	mortgages	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1997-2015.	Secondly	the	changes	in	the	outstanding	volume	of	home	mortgages	have	been	registered.	Thirdly	 the	effective	Fed	Funds	rates	have	been	 included	and	finally	 the	changes	 in	 the	annual	household	real	estate	values	have	been	documented.		Any	outstanding	loan	or	any	asset	owned	by	households	constitutes	a	potential	risk	not	only	 to	 the	mortgagor	and/or	the	owner	of	 the	asset	but	equally	 to	an	economy.	When	financial	claims	turn	into	doubtful	debts,	the	matter	is	not	only	one	 of	 concern	 to	 the	 borrower,	 but	 equally	 to	 the	 fund	 providers.	 When	 an	increasing	 scale	 of	 doubtful	 debtors	 sets	 off	 a	 self-fulfilling	 cycle	 of	 sales	 of	assets,	the	risks	to	an	economy	multiply.		The	real	question	is	when	do	household	risks	start	to	pose	a	threat	to	economic	growth,	 to	 employment	 levels	 and	 to	 government	 funding?	 Of	 course	 the	 last	turning	point	in	the	U.S.	economy	is	well	known:	August	2007.	But	knowing	the	turning	point	does	not	provide	an	answer	to	the	question:	at	which	point	in	time	could	 the	 recession	 of	 2007-2008	 still	 have	 been	 avoided	 and	what	measures	would	have	been	necessary	to	do	so.		Risk	 accumulation	 is	 the	 easy	 process;	 risk	 avoidance	 requires	 a	 full	understanding	 of	 potential	 triggers	 in	 the	 first	 place	 upon	 which	countermeasures	can	be	enacted.	Table	1	may	provide	some	guidance	as	to	what	happened	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1997-2015.			
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																																																																			Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Table	1:	Overview	of	the	U.S.	outstanding	mortgage	levels	over	the	period	1997-2015,	the	annual	change	in	mortgage	volumes,	the	effective	Fed	Funds	Rate	and	the	change	in	the	Households’	Real	Estate	values		
Year	 Outstanding	
Mortgage	levels	
X	$trillion	
	
Annual	increase	
In	Mortgage	
Volume		
X$billion	
Effective	
Fed	Funds		
Rate	%	
Increase	in	
Annual	
Household	
Real	 estate	
Values		
X$billion	
1997	 		3.753	 					216	 5.25-5.50	 				210	
1998	 		4.055	 					302	 5.56-4.68	 					836	
1999	 		4.431	 				376	 4.63-5.30	 					946	
2000	 		4.814	 					383	 5.45-6.40	 			1572	
2001	 		5.322	 					508	 5.98-1.82	 			1354	
2002	 		6.028	 				706	 1.73-1.24	 			1298	
2003	 		6.910	 					882	 1.24-0.98	 			1618	
2004	 		7.859	 					949	 1.00-2.16	 			2511	
2005	 		8.913	 		1054	 2.28-4.16	 			3014	
2006	 		9.910	 					997	 4.29-5.24	 					509	
2007	 10.613	 					703	 5.25-4.24	 -		1813	
2008	 10.580	 -						33	 3.94-0.16	 -		3197	
2009	 10.419	 -				161	 0.15-0.12	 -				454	
2010	 		9.921	 -				498	 0.11-0.18	 -				555	
2011	 		9.702	 -				219	 0.17-0.07	 -				293	
2012	 		9.491	 -				211	 0.08-0.16	 				1412	
2013	 		9.401	 -						90	 0.14-0.09	 				2102	
2014	 		9.400	 -								1	 0.07-0.12	 				1096	
2015	 		9.491	 							91	 0.11-0.24	 				1255			
1.2	The	risk	assessment	process		As	mentioned	 above,	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 collective	 U.S.	 mortgage	 portfolio	 was	extremely	 fast	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2007.	 The	 collective	 level	 increased	 from	$3.75	trillion	in	19971	to	$10.61	trillion	in	2007.	By	2007	the	level	of	outstanding	mortgage	 loans	 had	 overtaken	 the	U.S.	 government	 debt	 level,	 the	 latter	 being	$9.00	 trillion	 by	 30	 September	 2007.	 Long-term	 household	 debt	 had	 become	larger	than	government	debt.			What	was	striking	was	the	assessment	of	 the	collective	value	of	all	homes	over	the	 same	 period.	 The	 Federal	 Reserve	 publishes	 data	 on	 owner’s	 equity2	in	homes.	 In	 Q1	 1997	 the	 equity	 level	 amounted	 to	 $4.925	 trillion,	 while	 by	 Q1	2006	the	equity	level	had	increased	to	$13.267	trillion.																																																												1	https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/HMLBSHNO	2	https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/HMLBSHNO	
	 7	
																																																																																																				Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Compare	 these	 figures	 to	 U.S.	 GDP	 in	 nominal	 terms.	 At	 year-end	 1997,	 home	equity	 valuation	 was	 $5.105	 trillion	 compared	 to	 nominal	 U.S.	 GDP	 of	 $8.6	trillion.	In	2006	home	equity	valuation	had	shot	up	to	$13.267	trillion	while	U.S	nominal	GDP	had	grown	to	$13.9	trillion.	The	home	asset	values	as	compared	to	U.S.	output	had	increased	from	57.3%	in	1997	to	95.4%	in	2006.		Nominal	GDP	(=National	Income)	did	grow	by	54.3%	over	the	period	1997-2006,	but	home	asset	values	increased	by	159.9%	over	the	same	period;	nearly	three	times	 the	 speed	 of	 income	 growth.	 On	 an	 individual	 basis,	 no	 household	 can	afford	to	increase	long-term	borrowings	by	264%	(from	$3.753	trillion	in	1997	to	 $9.910	 trillion	 in	 2006)	when	 total	 income	 grows	 by	 only	 54.3%.	However,	this	 is	 exactly	 what	 happened	 in	 macro-economic	 terms	 in	 the	 U.S.	 over	 the	period	1997-2006.		It	is	instructive	to	pause	and	consider	what	home	asset	values	reflect.	A	realized	price	 for	 a	 particular	 sale	 of	 a	 home	 is	 just	 one	 transaction.	 However	 not	 all	existing	homes	are	sold	in	a	single	year	and	new	homes	are	added	to	the	stock	of	homes.	For	the	U.S.,	rough	estimates	indicate	that	perhaps	between	7	and	10%	of	the	 total	 housing	 stock	 comes	 on	 the	market	 in	 a	 single	 year.	 From	 a	macro-economic	 perspective,	 multiplying	 the	 total	 housing	 stock	 with	 the	 prices	achieved	for	selling	a	small	number	of	homes	can	be	very	be	misleading.			The	values	of	the	total	housing	stock	are	not	wrong,	but	are	not	right	either.	The	values	 do	 not	 reflect	 the	 income	 earning	 levels,	 which	 lie	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	repayment	 risk	 relating	 to	 mortgage	 loans.	 When	 National	 Income	 grows	 by	54.3%	over	the	period	1997-2006	and	the	housing	stock	values	grow	by	159.9%	over	 the	 same	 period,	 it	 is	 not	 that	 the	 National	 Income	 has	 been	 assessed	wrongly,	 but	 that	 the	 link	 between	 income	 and	 home	 value	 levels	 has	 broken	down.		If	each	buyer	would	have	had	to	use	his/hers	own	savings	to	buy	a	home,	there	could	not	have	been	a	break	in	the	link	between	income	and	values.	It	is	with	the	help	of	outside	funds	-home	mortgages-	that	this	link	can	break.	Such	a	scenario	becomes	accepted	reality	when	the	speed	of	mortgage	lending	growth	outstrips	the	macro-economic	income	growth.	Money,	as	in	personal	savings,	does	in	itself	not	provide	 any	danger	 to	 the	housing	market.	However	borrowed	money	 can	make	the	difference	between	steady	economic	growth	and	boom-bust	scenarios.		Financial	 risks	 on	 home	 mortgages	 were	 accumulated	 too	 rapidly	 over	 the	period	 1997-2006	 relative	 to	 income	 growth.	 The	 shift	 away	 from	 a	 direct	lender-borrower	relationship	through	securitization	of	assets	held	by	groups	of	borrowers	 and	 remote	 lenders	 further	 complicated	 the	picture	 and	 from	2004	securitization	 efforts	 were	 ramped	 up.	 Another	 complicating	 factor	 was	 the	acceleration	 in	 selling	 sub-prime	mortgages	 from	2004	 onwards.	However	 the	amounts	 involved	 were	 never	 more	 than	 $1.3	 trillion	 out	 of	 a	 total	 mortgage	portfolio	of	just	over	$10	trillion.	The	spark	that	set	off	the	financial	crisis	in				
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																																																																																																							Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			August	 2007	 may	 have	 been	 BNP	 Paribas’	 action	 to	 bar	 investors	 from	withdrawing	 money	 from	 three	 of	 its	 investment	 funds	 that	 held	 securities	backed	 by	 U.S.	 subprime	mortgages,	 but	 this	was	 just	 a	 symptom	 and	 not	 the	cause	of	the	crisis.	The	real	cause	was	that	the	accumulation	of	mortgage	lending	over	the	period	1997-2006	which	caused	house	prices	to	increase	at	a	speed	that	far	outpaced	 the	growth	 in	 the	National	 Income	 in	 the	U.S.	 and	 the	 increase	 in	income	levels	was	far	outpaced	by	house	price	increases.			
1.3	Why	did	the	interest	instrument	not	achieve	its	goals?	
	The	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 interest	 rate	 policy	 was	 not	 aimed	 at	 containing	 the	increase	in	households’	real	estate	values.	It	was	aimed	at	keeping	output	prices	at	a	growth	level	no	greater	than	2%	annually.	It	was	also	aimed	at	creating	the	right	environment	for	the	U.S.	economy	to	grow	and	keep	unemployment	levels	as	low	as	possible.		Why	did	the	interest	rate	policies	applied	by	the	Fed	not	prevent	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis?		The	main	reason	was	that	individual	households	behaved	in	a	manner,	 just	like	companies	do	frequently.	If	the	costs	of	borrowing	are	compared	to	the	potential	gains	 to	 be	 made	 by	 investing	 in	 a	 home	 –or	 in	 the	 case	 of	 companies	 in	 an	activity-	 than	 it	matters	 less	what	 the	 price	 of	 borrowing	 is	 –the	 interest	 rate	applicable-	 but	 what	 gains	 may	 be	 expected	 from	 the	 borrowed	 amount.	 For	many	homebuyers	a	current	known	cost	element	–the	interest	rate	payable-	was	set	 off	 against	 a	 potential	 future	 gain.	 Some	 people	 may	 call	 this	 speculation;	others	will	argue	that	it	is	a	well-considered	choice	based	on	market	history.		As	Table	1	shows,	in	each	year	from	1998-2005	the	annual	increase	in	mortgage	borrowing	was	much	 lower	 than	 the	 increase	 in	 annual	 household	 real	 estate	values.	 In	2005	 the	$1.054	 trillion	 in	net	new	borrowings	 led	 to	an	 increase	 in	household	 real	 estate	 values	 of	 $3.014	 trillion.	 Little	 wonder	 that	 many	households	were	enticed	to	 invest	 in	property,	notwithstanding	the	 increase	 in	effective	Fed	funds	rate	from	2.28%	to	4.16%	in	2005.		In	Ben	S.	Bernanke’s	book3:	 ‘The	courage	to	act’	 the	Fed’s	considerations	about	the	 causes	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 are	 exhaustively	 spelt	 out.	 Mr.	 Bernanke	acknowledges	 that	 high	 mortgage-lending	 levels	 might	 have	 resulted	 in	homeowners’	 real	 estate	 values	 to	 growing	 at	 an	 even	 faster	 speed.	 The	 latter	values	exceeded	National	 Income	growth	by	 three	 times	over	 the	period	1998-2005.	 The	macro-economic	 source	 of	 repayments	 for	 all	 debts	 is	 the	 National	Income	level.	When	income	levels	fell	materially	behind	the	home	value	growth																																																												3	http://books.wwnorton.com/books/detail.aspx?ID=4294989041	
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																																																																																																			Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		levels	during	2002-2004,	 alarm	bells	 should	have	 started	 ringing.	The	Fed	and	others	failed	to	act	on	these	warning	signs.		Is	the	interest	rate	tool	the	most	suitable	tool	to	bridge	the	gap	between	income	growth	 levels	 and	house	values?	Lowering	 interest	 rates	 is	 likely	 to	 encourage	economic	 growth	 levels.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 incomes	 will	 pick	 up.	 Rapidly	 rising	house	prices	might	require	higher	interest	rates	to	slow	down	such	rise.		There	 are	 two	 considerations	 that	 make	 the	 actual	 level	 of	 interest	 rates	 less	relevant.	The	first	one	was	the	mentioned	household	sentiment	factor:	expecting	house	prices	to	go	up	faster	than	the	costs	of	borrowing.	The	second	one	is	that	the	volume	of	mortgage	 lending	 is	not	build	up	 in	a	year	or	 so,	but	over	many	years	and	under	many	different	short-term	interest	rates.	Any	change	 in	short-term	interest	rates	will	not	affect	 the	mortgage	obligations	of	many	borrowers,	who	took	out	their	mortgages	in	previous	years.		This	 begs	 the	 question:	 why	 chose	 the	 National	 Income	 growth	 level	 as	 the	benchmark	 for	 comparing	 it	with	 the	 household	 real	 estate	 values	 rather	 than	the	growth	level	of	the	outstanding	mortgages?		As	 Table	 1	 shows,	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 fixed	 multiplier	 between	 the	 annual	incremental	amount	in	mortgage	lending	and	the	annual	increase	in	house	price	values.	The	volumes	of	newly	build	homes	may	play	a	 role,	 population	growth	could	play	a	role,	average	family	size	changes	could	change	the	picture	and	there	may	be	more	factors	involved.			What	 is	 certain	 is	 that	 the	mutations	 in	 National	 Income	 levels	 determine	 the	general	ability	of	an	economy	to	repay	outstanding	debt	 levels,	 including	home	mortgage	debt.	On	the	other	hand	changes	in	house	price	valuations	determine	the	 attraction	 for	 households	 to	 ramp	 up	 or	 slow	 down	 their	 borrowing	behavior.		Therefore,	 policy	 makers	 need	 to	 follow	 and	 compare	 the	 trends	 in	 National	Income	levels	and	in	annual	household	real	estate	values.	These	trends	combine	the	 two	most	 relevant	 factors	 in	 determining	whether	 home	mortgage	 lending	levels	grow	too	fast.	Action	may	be	needed,	but	changing	the	interest	rate	levels	is	likely	to	have	a	minor	impact	only.	With	the	lowest	Fed	funds	rates	on	record	for	some	eight	years	since	2008,	households	reduced	their	home	mortgages	level	by	some	$1	trillion	or	just	over	10%.			
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2	The	role	of	the	banking	and	financial	sector	in	the	financial	crisis	
	With	hindsight	some	relatively	easy	observations	are	possible.	Was	it	the	role	of	an	 individual	 bank	 to	 curtail	 its	mortgage-lending	book,	when	 the	 competition	was	 expanding	 their	 mortgage	 book?	 Of	 course,	 every	 institution	 had	 an	obligation	 to	 its	 shareholders	 to	 maximize	 profits	 within	 specified	 risk	 limits.	The	 point	 is	 that	 the	 collective	 of	 banks	 created	 the	 outstanding	 mortgage	lending	levels,	not	just	one	or	another	bank.	If	the	rise	in	the	U.S.	mortgage	loan	book	was	too	rapid	over	the	period	1997-2005	–which	it	was-	then	it	would	have	been	 logical	 that	 the	 regulators	 would	 have	 invented	 solutions	 to	 curb	 such	lending	rather	than	punish	individual	banks.	As	explained	in	the	previous	section	just	moving	the	Fed	funds	rate	up	and	down	would	have	been	rather	ineffective	because	of	the	popular	sentiment	toward	the	housing	market.		The	volume	growth	 in	outstanding	mortgage	 loans	over	 the	period	1997-2006	may	have	been	 the	 logical	 consequence	of	banking	competition	 since	no	 single	bank	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 collective	 growth.	 The	 growth	 level	was	 too	 fast	with	the	value	of	household	real	estate	holdings	far	outstripping	National	Income	growth.		Only	the	banking	supervisory	authorities	could	have	taken	measures	to	slow	down	such	lending	patterns,	but	with	the	ineffectual	exception	of	adjusting	Fed	funds	rates	occasionally,	they	failed	to	act.		Some	banks	in	their	hunger	for	profits	resorted	to	more	dubious	practices,	which	significantly	increased	the	severity	of	the	crisis.	From	2004,	banks	in	their	drive	for	 short	 term	profits	 increasingly	 started	 to	 sell	 sub-prime	mortgages,	 not	 on	the	basis	of	their	client’s	creditworthiness,	but	pinned	on	the	hope	that	the	rise	in	house	prices	would	 cover	 their	 risks.	 If	 a	 client	defaulted	under	 a	mortgage	loan	 agreement,	 a	 sale	 of	 the	 house	would	 return	 the	 loan	 proceeds.	 In	 effect	banks	 started	 to	 act	 like	 a	 large	 number	 of	 their	 customers.	 They	 focused	 on	future	asset	values	rather	than	on	income	affordability	by	the	borrower.	Among	others	‘interest	only’	mortgages	were	offered,	 ‘teaser	rates’	were	offered	with	a	below	market	starting	up	interest	rate	for	some	two	years	followed	by	a	big	hike	in	rates	thereafter.		The	 volume	 growth	 of	 the	 collective	 home	 mortgage	 book	 is	 a	 logical	consequence	 of	 having	 banks	 compete	 with	 one	 another.	 Banks	 cannot	 and	should	not	be	blamed	for	responding	to	a	competitive	environment.	However,	it	became	 a	 different	matter	when	banks	no	 longer	 based	 their	 creditworthiness	assessment	on	 the	 income	 level	 of	 the	borrower	but	on	potential	 future	house	prices.	 The	widespread	 use	 of	 subprime	mortgages	 from	2004	 onwards	was	 a	classical	example	of	banks	moving	the	goal	posts.		With	 the	 effect	 of	 amplifying	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 crisis,	 banks	 also	 engaged	 in	securitization	 of	 mortgage	 portfolios.	 Securitization	 severs	 the	 link	 between	lender	 and	 borrower.	 It	 combines	 and	 repackages	 pools	 of	 underlying	mortgages,	which	is	then	offered	to	investors.	It	is	widely	accepted	that	credit																																																																																																						
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																																																																																															Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		rating	agencies	did	a	pretty	poor	job	in	assessing	the	risks	of	such	securities.	The	global	distribution	of	these	securities	by	the	banks,	internationalized	the	funding	element	of	the	U.S.	mortgage	portfolio.	Group	risks	on	mortgagors,	poor	work	by	the	 credit	 rating	agencies	and	overseas	 involvement	 in	 the	 funding	element	all	constituted	factors	that	made	the	financial	crisis	more	difficult	to	contain	than	it	would	 otherwise	 have	 been.	 Again	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 supervisors	 did	 not	 act	against	the	face	of	these	emerging	risks.					
3	 The	 actual	 and	 potential	 policy	 responses	 to	 the	 2007-2008	 financial	
crisis	
	In	addition	 to	 lowering	 the	Fed	 funds	 rate	 in	2008	 to	 its	 lowest	 level	 ever,	 the	Fed	reacted	to	the	crisis	by	supporting	many	banks	and	some	other	specialized	financial	 institutions	by	providing	 liquidity	 to	 these	 financial	sector	companies.	Some	were	beyond	salvation,	such	as	Lehman	Brothers;	others	like	nearly	all	the	big	banks	needed	this	support	to	survive.	In	2007-2008	banks	did	not	trust	other	banks	 and	 therefore	 hoarded	 liquidity	 instead	 of	 smoothing	 out	 daily	 liquidity	ups	 and	 downs	 between	 themselves.	 The	 downward	 spiral	 of	 increasing	mortgage	loan	defaults	combined	with	falling	house	prices	put	a	great	strain	on	bank	equity	levels.		Providing	liquidity	to	financial	market	participants	became	a	major	objective	for	the	Fed	during	the	initial	crisis	period.	In	this	effort	the	Fed	did	have	the	courage	to	act	 and	did	 it	under	great	 stress.	Every	day	during	 this	period	brought	new	challenges.			In	 2009	 and	 following	 years,	 the	 Fed	 launched	 a	 series	 of	 purchases	 of	 U.S.	government	and	mortgage	bonds,	ultimately	to	the	extent	of	some	$4.3	trillion;	Quantitative	Easing.	The	aim	was	to	inject	funds	into	these	markets,	so	that	the	banking	 sector	 was	 enabled	 to	 lend	 more	 to	 their	 customers.	 As	 Table	 1	illustrates	this	injection	of	funds	bypassed	the	individual	households	altogether	as	 household’s	 aim	 was	 to	 restore	 each	 individual	 own	 balance	 sheet	 before	taking	on	new	loans.	What	the	purchases	also	brought	about	was	to	lower	long-term	interest	rates	to	the	lowest	interest	rates	on	record.	According	to	the	most	recent	Fed	Balance	sheet4,	 it	 still	holds	some	$4.245	 trillion	 in	securities	on	 its	books.	 The	 Fed	 neutralizes	 this	 liquidity	 provision	 by	 offering	 banks	 the	opportunity	 to	deposit	 surplus	 funds	with	 the	Fed.	 It	pays	a	positive	spread	 to	the	banks	over	short-term	U.S.	government	securities.	With	any	 increase	 in	the	Fed	funds	rate	these	payments	will	increase	and	affect	negatively	the	profits	the	Fed	will	transfer	to	the	U.S.	Treasury.		In	 connection	with	 individual	 households,	what	 the	 Fed	 and	 others	 regulators	seem	to	have	missed	was	to	study	and	subsequently	act	upon	the	link	between	the	National	Income	developments	and	the	Household	Real	Estate	values.																																																											4	http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1	
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																																																																																																				Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			What	could	have	been	done	differently?	A	number	of	tools	could	have	been	used	and	 they	 can	 still	 have	 a	 place	when	 the	 next	 gyration	 in	 the	 housing	market	occurs.																																																																																																							
3.1.	Set	up	an	early	warning	system	
	An	 ‘early	 warning’	 system	 could	 be	 installed	 which	 sounds	 an	 alarm	 once	 it	becomes	 clear	 that	 house	 price	 increases	 are	 running	 much	 faster	 than	 the	National	 Income	growth.	 Such	a	 system	could	use	 ‘traffic	 lights’	 to	warn	banks	that	caution	is	required.		Green	would	 indicate	 that	 the	mortgage	markets	 are	 not	 growing	 too	 fast	 and	may	 continue	 to	 grow	 until	 further	 notice.	 Amber	 for	 when	 the	 speed	 of	mortgage	 lending	 growth	 is	 becoming	 excessive	 and	 signaling	 that	 lenders	should	slow	down	their	 lending	volumes	with	red	reserved	for	when	mortgage	volumes	 are	 growing	 too	 fast.	 The	 Fed	 could	 indicate	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 the	mortgage	 market	 may	 safely	 grow.	 Any	 institution	 exceeding	 such	 speed	 of	growth	might	be	penalized	as	it	risks	undermining	the	volume	targets	needed	to	avoid	a	boom-bust	situation.		Banks	cannot	be	expected	to	stop	mortgage	lending	volumes	to	grow	voluntarily,	hence	a	simple	but	effective	 traffic	management	system	helps	 to	avoid	 that	 the	U.S.	economy	will	not	return	to	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	situation	again.		A	 structural	 weakness	 in	 banking	 supervision	 would	 have	 to	 be	 overcome	 as	regulatory	oversight	was	and	to	some	extent	still	is	divided	over	the	12	Federal	Reserve	banks	and	various	State	organizations.	The	Federal	Reserve	could	be	put	in	charge	operating	such	warning	and	traffic	management	system.				
3.2.	Set	up	a	home	mortgage	quality	control	system	
	Banks	and	other	financial	institutions	are	very	adept	in	developing	products	that	help	 their	profits	rise	 in	 the	short	 term.	Subprime	mortgages	and	 ‘teaser’	 rates	are	just	a	few	of	the	examples	that	come	to	mind.	Mortgage	backed	securitization	is	 another	 example.	 There	 is	 nothing	 wrong	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 finding	investors	other	than	banks	to	fund	mortgage	portfolios.	However	the	practice	as	executed	in	the	U.S.	from	2004-2007	left	much	to	be	desired.		Banks	may	prefer	their	freedom	of	the	markets,	but	market	freedoms	should	not	come	with	a	price	tag	for	society	as	a	whole,	which	is	at	odds	with	the	benefit	of	the	entrepreneurial	freedoms	acquired.	For	instance	it	cannot	be	right	that	over	the	 period	 2006-2013	 as	 a	 result	 of	 bad	 bank	 practices	 21.3	 million	 U.S.	households	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	or	nearly	45%	of	all																																																																																																				
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																																																																																																				Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning								mortgagors.	 It	 can	 also	 not	 be	 right	 that	 1	 out	 of	 every	 8	 households	 with	 a	mortgage	lost	their	home	over	the	same	period.	It	cannot	be	right	that	7.8	million	workers	 lost	 their	 jobs	 between	 2007	 and	 20105	as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	financial	 crisis.	Finally	 it	 cannot	be	 right	 that	as	a	 consequence	of	 the	 financial	crisis	U.S.	government	debt	more	than	doubled	from	$9.22	trillion	by	the	end	of	2007	to	$18.922	trillion	by	the	end	of	20156.		For	 these	 reasons	 a	mortgage	 quality	 control	 system	 could	 be	 put	 in	 place.	 In	1994	 Congress	 with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Fed	 passed	 the	 Home	 Ownership	 and	Equity	 Protection	 Act	 (HOEPA),	 to	 outlaw	 abusive	mortgage	 lending	 practices.	However	 this	 Act	 concentrated	 on	 predatory	 lending	 practices	 and	 it	 did	 not	intend	 to	 impede	 ‘legitimate’	 access	 to	 the	 subprime	mortgage	markets.	When	the	Act	was	drafted	no	one	had	foreseen	the	volume-lending	boom	of	the	early	2000s.	Furthermore	 implementation	of	 the	Act	was	not	helped	by	 the	 fact	 that	implementation	 was	 executed	 by	 many	 regulatory	 bodies,	 without	 anyone	 of	them	having	full	management	control.			A	major	flaw	of	the	Act	is	that	it	dealt	only	with	individual	household	cases	and	not	with	the	macro	economic	impact	of	a	mortgage	lending	boom	supported	by	banking	 practices	 often	 no	 longer	 based	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 households	 to	 repay	outstanding	mortgages	out	of	current	income,	but	out	of	future	expected	values	of	 the	 home	 being	 financed.	 The	 ‘crime’,	 which	 the	 Act	 failed	 to	 cover,	 is	 an	‘economic	crime’,	committed	by	wantonly	placing	customers	in	a	‘loss’	situation	when	it	was	known	or	could	be	expected	that	house	prices	were	no	longer	rising.	
	
	
3.3	Marry	the	early	warning	system	with	the	quality	control	one	
	Mortgage	 lending	 was	 at	 the	 amber	 level	 in	 2002-2003.	 The	 policy	 measures	needed	at	 that	point	would	have	been	 twofold:	 to	 introduce	a	product	 liability	system	for	banks	and	introduce	a	macro-economic	reserve	policy	(MERP).		Most	companies,	when	they	sell	a	product,	provide	a	guarantee	that	the	product	will	 operate	 satisfactorily	 during	 the	 lifetime	 of	 the	 product.	 Banks	 cannot	guarantee	 that	 the	 home	 mortgage	 client	 will	 not	 default	 on	 home	 mortgage	payments.	However	the	amber	stage	in	home	mortgage	lending	indicates	that	the	net	 volume	growth	 in	new	 lending	 is	 reaching	a	dangerous	pitch.	The	Fed	and	with	it	all	other	bank	and	financial	sector	regulators	could	stipulate	that	any	new	home	 mortgage	 requires	 a	 financial	 reserve	 set	 aside	 within	 the	 originating	institution	at	 a	higher	 level	 than	 the	previous	one.	For	 instance,	 if	 3%	was	 the	expectation	of	the	annual	level	of	doubtful	debtors	before	the	amber	stage,	the																																																										5	http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/203740.pdf	6	http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/search?startMonth=12&startDay=31&startYear=2007&endMonth=12&endDay=31&endYear=2015	
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																																																																																																				Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			Fed	could	dictate	that	5%	is	added	to	the	reserves	for	any	new	home	mortgage.	The	second	stipulation	could	be	that	such	reserves	have	to	be	kept	in	place	until	the	 home	 mortgage	 has	 been	 fully	 repaid.	 Selling	 the	 funding	 side	 of	 the	mortgage	to	third	parties	should	not	be	a	factor	in	releasing	such	reserves.	They	should	stay	in	place	until	the	end	of	the	mortgage	period.		The	 ‘red’	 stage	 requires	a	more	drastic	approach,	 as	 this	 stage	 reflects	 the	 fact	that	the	macro-economic	development	of	the	relevant	country	is	at	serious	risk.	This	 happened	 during	 2004-2006	 in	 the	 U.S.	 	 A	material	macro-economic	 risk	necessitates	a	quite	different	counter-measure.			Jobs	 are	 at	 risks.	 7.8	 million	 people	 lost	 their	 jobs	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	financial	crisis.	Government	funding	is	at	risk	as	demonstrated	by	the	doubling	of	government	 debt	 from	 $9	 trillion	 to	 nearly	 $19	 trillion	 over	 the	 period	 2007-2015.	The	financial	stability	of	25	million	households	was	at	risk	as	foreclosure	proceedings	were	started	against	them.	Building	enough	new	homes	was	put	at	risk.	 If	 annually	 1.8	million	 new	 homes	were	 needed,	 the	 cumulative	 shortfall	over	the	period	2008-2015	reached	7.830	million.		The	macro-economic	risks	caused	by	an	excessive	speed	of	lending	put	not	only	banks	at	risk,	but	also	jobs,	 incomes,	pension	savings,	government	expenditure,	home	building	and	of	course	companies	due	to	a	reduced	demand	for	goods	and	services.		A	well	 considered	 response	would	 be	 to	 ensure	 that	 at	 the	 red	 stage	 the	 new	reserves	built	up	for	doubtful	debtors	on	home	mortgages	are	available	not	just	to	 the	 banks	 and	 their	 shareholders,	 but	 to	 the	 population	 at	 large:	 from	Wall	Street	 to	 Main	 Street.	 Such	 a	 MERP	 would	 consist	 of	 two	 elements:	 firstly,	 it	would	increase	the	reserve	ratio	to	some	8%	for	all	new	home	mortgage	lending	and	secondly,	the	reserves	should	be	placed	away	from	the	lender	and	at	the	Fed	in	the	form	of	U.S.	government	securities.	It	could	be	decided	that	such	reserves	have	to	stay	at	the	Fed	until	the	mortgage	loans	have	been	repaid.	Furthermore	as	 the	 threat	 is	one	 to	 the	macro-economy	of	 the	U.S.,	 such	reserves	should	be	pledged	to	the	Fed	and	the	U.S.	government	in	case	of	bank	failure.	In	effect	the	transfer	 of	 reserves	 to	 the	 Fed	 would	 constitute	 a	 provisional	 penalty	 for	 the	financial	institution	involved	in	order	to	get	the	micro	and	the	macro	policies	in	line.	 Rather	 than	 issuing	 penalties	 after	 the	 recession	 period	 as	 is	 being	 done	currently,	 a	 preventive	 method	 would	 be	 the	 up-front	 transfer	 of	 reserve	amounts	based	on	net	new	home	mortgage	lending.		The	return	of	such	reserve	funds	 to	 the	 financial	 institution	 involved	 should	 only	 take	 place	 once	 the	performance	 of	 the	 underlying	mortgages	 can	 be	 assessed	 as	 satisfactory	with	‘satisfactory’	 denoting	 a	 portfolio	 performance	 in	 line	 with	 that	 of	 the	 best	lending	years.		
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3.4	Helicopter	money	-	set	up	a	National	Mortgage	Bank	(NMB)	
	One	of	the	aims	of	economic	policy	should	be	to	avoid	an	economy	going	into	a	recession.	 The	 tools	 as	 set	 out	 above	were	 not	 used	 before	 the	 financial	 crisis	erupted,	but	could	be	used	in	future.		The	 establishment	 of	 an	 additional	 tool	 to	 counteract	 the	 excessive	 lending	patterns	may	need	to	be	considered.	In	a	paper:	“Are	countries	prepared	for	the	next	 recession”7	by	 this	author,	 it	was	suggested	 to	set	up	a	National	Mortgage	Bank.		The	 main	 aim	 of	 an	 NMB	 is	 to	 act	 as	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 for	 individual	households.			A	National	Mortgage	Bank	would	not	be	a	mortgage	 lender	or	originator	 in	the	normal	sense.	One	could	not	visit	its	office	to	obtain	a	mortgage.	It	is	also	not	a	Fannie	 Mae	 or	 Freddy	 Mac,	 organizations	 that	 facilitate	 long-term	 fixed	 rate	mortgages.	What	 it	 would	 be,	 is	 an	 instrument	 of	 economic	 policy,	 only	 to	 be	called	 into	 action	 as	 and	when	 the	number	 of	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 start	 to	grow	substantially.		Under	 the	 guidance	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 and	 the	 Fed,	 the	 NMB	 could	 help	households	 threatened	with	 foreclosure	 proceedings	with	monetary	 assistance	for	 a	 limited	 period	 of	 time.	 Such	 assistance	 may	 be	 varied	 according	 to	 the	income	group,	to	which	the	householder	belongs,	with	the	lowest	income	group	receiving	more	help	than	the	higher	ones.	The	assistance	can	be	a	combination	of	‘helicopter’	money	–an	outright	grant	element-	and	a	mortgage	loan	element.	The	financial	support	should	not	eliminate	the	obligation	of	the	mortgagor	to	share	in	the	monthly	payments.	For	the	mortgage	loan	element	a	subordinated	mortgage	claim	could	be	established.			From	a	macro-economic	perspective	an	NMB	set-up	helps	to	prevent	forced	sales	of	 homes	 in	 a	 downward	 house	 price	market.	 It	 helps	 households	 to	 continue	spending	 on	 other	 goods	 and	 services,	 rather	 than	 being	 involved	 in	 an	accelerated	repayment	schedule	of	 the	outstanding	mortgage	amounts.	 It	helps	to	keep	employment	levels	up.	It	helps	to	keep	tax	revenues	up.	It	lowers	the	risk	profile	 on	 home	 mortgages	 for	 all	 banks,	 financial	 institutions	 and	 the	 fund	providers	 through	mortgage-backed	 securities;	 all	 of	 whom	 should	 pay	 a	 risk	premium	to	the	NMB.		What	an	NMB	needs	is	a	U.S.	government	decision	on	establishing	such	a	bank	at	an	early	stage	in	order	to	be	ready	when	the	next	recession	strikes.		
	
																																																									7	https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/70209.html	
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4.	Some	conclusions		
• The	philosophy	that	house	price	rises	in	the	U.S.	were	the	result	of	supply	and	 demand	 factors	 and	 therefore	 should	 not	 be	 the	 subject	 of	government	intervention	turned	out	to	be	an	erroneous	one	as	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	testified.		
• The	main	reason	was	that	borrowed	funds	were	used	to	acquire	homes,	rather	than	personal	savings.			
• Over	the	period	1997-2005	the	net	annual	volume	increase	in	borrowed	funds	 for	 home	 acquisitions	 multiplied	 from	 $216	 billion	 in	 1997	 to	$1.054	trillion	in	2005;	a	nearly	fivefold	increase	in	borrowed	funds.		
• The	 net	 annual	 increase	 in	 household	 real	 estate	 values	 rose	 over	 the	period	1997-2005	from	$210	billion	in	1997	to	$3.014	trillion	in	2005;	an	increase	of	over	14	times.		
• Between	2001	and	2006	many	households	in	taking	out	mortgages	based	their	 decisions	 on	 the	 known	 interest	 rate	 charges	 and	 compared	 these	with	the	potential	price	increases	of	their	acquired	home:	the	household	sentiment	factor.	Not	the	income	level	but	the	potential	opportunity	of	a	substantial	value	gain	drove	the	house	market.		
• Banks	 helped	 to	 perpetuate	 these	 sentiments.	 The	 strong	 push	 of	subprime	mortgages	from	2004	onwards	–interest	only	and	teaser	rates	mortgages	for	instance-	were	the	wrong	products	at	the	wrong	time.	The	securitization	 of	 such	 mortgages	 increased	 the	 macro-economic	 risks	further,	 by	 turning	 long-term	 risks	 into	 a	 daily	 tradable	 risk.		Securitization	also	caused	the	internationalization	of	the	risks.		
• Subprime	mortgages	 were	 not	 stopped	 by	 the	 regulators	 nor	 were	 the	securitization	of	these	products;	the	legislation	in	place	did	not	deal	with	macro-economic	 disturbances,	 but	 only	with	misselling	 of	mortgages	 to	individual	households.		
• In	macro-economic	 terms	 if	 the	 growth	 in	National	 Income	 is	 far	 lower	than	the	growth	in	long-term	borrowings,	the	level	of	doubtful	debtors	is	bound	to	increase	dramatically.		
• The	 Fed	 and	 other	 regulators	 could	 have	 acted	 differently.	 Their	conventional	tool	base	comprised	mainly	of	the	Fed	funds	rate,	which	was	not	 meant	 to	 deal	 with	 house	 price	 increases.	 Even	 if	 it	 had	 done	 so,	moving	 interest	 rates	 would	 not	 have	 been	 effective	 as	 the	 household	sentiment	factor	was	strong	and	based	on	future	gains	in	house	prices.		 	
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• More	 effective	 tools	 that	 could	 have	 been	 deployed	 include	 the	 “early	warning	 or	 traffic	 light	 system”,	 a	 “home	 mortgage	 quality	 control	system”,	and	a	“Macro-economic	reserve	policy	system”.	The	latter	system	would	move	new	reserves	away	from	the	banking	system	into	a	protected	account	with	the	Fed,	so	as	to	protect	the	public	at	large	from	the	costs	of	recessions	caused	by	the	lending	excess.		
• Finally	a	“National	Mortgage	Bank”	could	be	set	up	to	help	households	as	a	 lender	of	 last	resort	 in	order	to	stretch	out	mortgage	payments	over	a	longer	period	of	time	and	overcome	the	threat	of	a	forced	sale	of	homes.	An	element	of	“helicopter	money”	could	be	combined	with	a	subordinated	claim	on	the	property.		
• The	use	of	helicopter	money	in	a	targeted	approach	such	as	via	a	National	Mortgage	Bank	should	be	the	preferred	approach	rather	than	helping	all	households	 indiscriminately.	 A	 shared	 risk	 approach	 between	 a	government,	 the	 banks	 and	 the	 household	 sector	 provides	 the	 best	strategy	for	averting	another	financial	crisis.		
• The	 preventive	 measures	 discussed	 herein	 would	 have	 helped	 the	economy	 to	 stay	 on	 a	 steady	 growth	 path;	 it	 would	 have	 avoided	 the	situation	 where	 many	 mortgagors	 lost	 their	 homes	 or	 were	 forced	 to	allocate	 a	 large	 share	 of	 incomes	 to	 the	 (p)repayment	 of	 	 their	outstanding	loans;	it	would	have	avoided	the	large	number	of	jobs	being	lost	 and	 it	 would	 have	 avoided	 the	 doubling	 in	 U.S.	 government	 debt	levels	from	$9	trillion	in	2007	to	nearly	$19	trillion	in	2015.	It	would	also	have	 meant	 that	 rather	 than	 not	 building	 the	 7.8	 million	 homes;	 more	homes	would	have	been	built.				Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood,	U.K.	8th	June	2016							
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